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Securing Foreign Oil:
A Case for Including Military Operations
in the Climate Change Impact of Fuels
by Adam J. Liska and Richard K. Perrin

M

ilitary operations are major
industrial activities that use
massive amounts of fuel
and materials that significantly contribute to climate change. In this article, we assert that military activity
to protect international oil trade is a
direct production component for importing foreign oil— as necessary for
imports as are pipelines and supertankers—and therefore the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from

that military activity are relevant to
U.S. fuel policies related to climate
change. Military security for protection of global maritime petroleum
distribution is part of the acquisition
process, but in addition, recent Middle Eastern wars may also be related
to securing petroleum reserves.
A component of U.S. motor fuel
policy has been to encourage the development of biofuels as substitutes
for petroleum, both to reduce de9

pendence on foreign oil and to reduce GHG emissions. To qualify for
this substitution under the U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007 (EISA), specific biofuel types
must reduce GHG emissions by set
amounts from 20 to 60 percent compared with gasoline. The EISA legislation demands evaluation of not
only direct life cycle emissions from
biofuels, but also all potentially significant indirect emissions. Yet the
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gasoline emissions against which
this is compared consist only of direct life cycle emissions, which to
this point have not included emissions due to the military component of transporting foreign oil to
the United States. These military
emissions are analyzed here to determine their contribution to the life
cycle GHG emissions from gasoline
production. This analysis builds on a
recent estimate that emissions from
military security raised the GHG intensity of U.S. gasoline derived from
Middle Eastern imports by twofold
compared with direct emissions.1
Direct GHG emissions from the
production of biofuels are becoming better understood after years
of scientific controversy.2 Unfortunately, the process of setting regulatory GHG emissions standards for
fuels is complicated by poorly understood indirect GHG emissions
that result from the production of
both biofuels and gasoline.3 A significant but elusive indirect component of biofuel emissions are those
resulting from international land use
change caused by increased commodity prices due to biofuel production. These indirect emissions
have been difficult to quantify because they result from complex market-driven ripple effects that are projected into an uncertain future.4 Yet
in comparing biofuel emissions with
those from gasoline, current regulatory analysis excludes indirect emissions from gasoline and neglects military security emissions that should
be considered to directly result from
oil consumption. In order to have a
balanced assessment of the climate
change impacts of substituting biofuels for gasoline, a comparison of
all direct and indirect emissions
from both types of fuel is required.
The analysis presented here contributes to a more complete assessment
of total GHG emissions related to
gasoline use, by including emissions
from military activities related to the
protection and acquisition of foreign
crude oil.
The United States is truly “addicted to oil.” To maintain the current fuel supply, the United States
imports 11 million barrels per day
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An oil tanker anchored at a refinery in Japan. Wikimedia Commons/Mohan R.

(mb/d) of crude oil and refined petroleum products (net imports),
which is 57 percent of the 19.4
mb/d of petroleum consumed in
the United States in 2008.5 Roughly
half of imports and 31 percent of
consumption are imported from
member states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel. Imports from
the Persian Gulf in the Middle East
supplied 18 percent of total imports
(2.37 mb/d) and constituted 12 percent of crude oil used in the United
States in 2008. Of the petroleum
products used in the U.S. market, 46
percent was in the form of gasoline.
Supertankers transport more than
half of globally traded crude oil,
and the majority of oil imports to
the United States arrive via four supertankers per day.6 But this maritime “pipeline” is not free from serious threats. Pirates off the Horn of
Africa from Somalia, terrorists, and
“rogue” states provide strong justification for the United States to protect oil transportation from volatile
regions of the world to the United
States and Europe. Some maritime
transit routes are particularly hostile
and have had a history of disruption,
including the Strait of Hormuz, the
Suez Canal, and the Gulf of Aden,
among others (see Figure 1). In 2003

alone, roughly 100 oil tankers were
attacked around the world.7 In this
article, we estimate the total GHG
emissions from military activity related to petroleum. Our analysis first
estimates total GHG emissions from
the U.S. military, then considers how
military activities are related to oil
transport and acquisition, and what
fraction of these emissions should be
attributed to gasoline.

GHG Emissions from U.S.
Military Activity in the
Persian Gulf
Following the principles of life
cycle assessment (LCA), we evaluate military emissions from both direct fuel consumption and upstream
emissions related to the manufacture
of materials and equipment procured for military activities. Because
conventional military security and
activities for the Iraq War have different relationships to oil, we estimate emissions from those two categories separately.
We first estimate the amount of
emissions from conventional military activity (excluding the Iraq
War), then later estimate the fraction attributable to oil-related ac-
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tivities. The U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) reports that total
conventional energy use by the U.S.
military in 2008 was 889 trillion
British thermal units (Btu), the majority of which was from petroleum
products, but also included considerable amounts of electricity and
natural gas. We use estimates of average emissions from each of these
categories to calculate total emissions from this energy use, which
amounts to about 85 million metric tons (MMt) of carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2e) (see Table 1). We
estimate that an additional 87 MMt
was emitted in connection with
manufacturing of materials, equip-

&

climate change impact of fuels

ment, military infrastructure, vehicles, and munitions. Recent estimates of the GHG emissions from
manufacture of these categories are
unavailable, but emissions are certainly sizable given that 14.4 percent of U.S. industrial employment was in the defense industry in
1992.8 Employment in the defense
industry is predominantly in the
southern “Gunbelt” states of California, Texas, and Florida.9 Expenditures on military acquisitions totaled about $246 billion in 2009, and
the EIA reports an emissions factor of 0.300 million tons of CO2e per
billion dollars of goods produced
in the manufacturing sector. We as-
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sume that this intensity also applies
to military acquisitions, which results in the estimate of 87 MMt of
emissions resulting from the manufacturing of 2009 military acquisitions. Together, emissions from
conventional military fuel use and
acquisitions total about 172 MMt of
CO2e per year. This implies an intensity factor of 0.289 MMt of CO2e
per billion dollars of conventional
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
expenditures.
According to a recent U.S. Congressional Research Service report,
the average annual cost of the Iraq
War has been $93.5 billion. (Alternatively, the full monetary cost of

Figure 1. Global supply of U.S. crude oil imports, global oil reserves, maritime oil transit choke points, and the Area of Responsibility for U.S. Central Command. Countries in gray export oil to the U.S. at >0.2 mb/d or have >20 billion barrels of oil
reserves. Country labels in parentheses indicate: 1) U.S. imports designated in mb/d, 2) oil reserves in billion barrels, and 3)
the percentage of global reserves. Oil shipping rates at maritime choke points are for 2006.
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (Washington, DC, 2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/
World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html (accessed 11 February 2010); Reserves from U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Annual Energy Review 2008, DOE/EIA-0384(2008) (Washington, DC, 2009), p. 313; Imports from U.S. Energy Information Administration,
U.S. Total Crude Oil and Products Imports, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_ mbblpd_a.htm (accessed 15 February 2010).
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the Iraq War was projected by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) to range between $2.7 to $5 trillion dollars,
including more complete “resetting” of military infrastructure and
other indirect costs such as veterans’ healthcare.10) As there is no additional information on the composition of these war expenditures,
we utilize the 0.289 intensity factor calculated for conventional military expenditures to approximate
the emissions related to the war at
27 MMt per year. (We suspect that

&

war expenditures are more heavily weighted toward high-emission
items such as fuel, munitions, vehicles, and concrete than conventional military expenditures, but we
have no data that would support
calculation of a separate intensity
for war expenditures.) In addition
to the kinds of emissions embodied
in the 0.289 intensity factor, Reisch
and Kretzmann (2008) have noted
a number of additional emissions
due to the war.11 These emissions
include extra supply chain fuel, ce-
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ment for war installations and repair of war-damaged infrastructure,
well fires and flaring that occur during wartime, and fuel for troop deployment. Adding these emissions,
we estimate the annual emissions
related to the war to be 43.3 MMt
CO2e.
To determine the relevance of
these emissions to U.S. gasoline consumption, we now turn to the more
difficult issue of connecting the military activity to gasoline use in the
United States.

Table 1. Estimation of U.S. Military Life Cycle GHG Emissions
		
Estimated GHG
		Emissions,
Emissions category
Calculations
Million Mt CO2e
Direct conventional fuel use by militarya
Total DOD conventional energy use, 2008 —
Petroleum use—67% jet fuel

696 trillion Btu ×
(0.0691 MMt CO2e per trillion Btub)

61.7

Electricity use—primary 1

01 trillion Btu ×
(0.0600 MMt CO2e per trillion Btub)

18.9

Natural gas and other

93 trillion Btu ×
(0.0504 MMt CO2e per trillion Btub)

4.7

($246c expenditure) ×
(0.300 MMt CO2e per $billion in 2002 dollars)

86.8

Upstream emissions
Conventional expenditures for
acquisitions and infrastructure, 2009c

Total conventional GHG emissions per year 		
Implied conventional DoD emissions factor
(MMT CO2e per billion dollars)
Average annual direct U.S. emissions
due to the Iraq War

(172 MMt CO2e)/
($595 billion DoD expenditures in 2009)
($93.5 billion annual expenditured) ×
(0.289 MMt CO2e /$b))

172
0.289

27.0

Annual indirect emissions related to the
Iraq Ware 		

16.3

Total annual emissions related to the Iraq War 		

43.3

Sources:
a EIA (2009)5, p. 29, 40, 349.
b Average GHG intensities for transportation, electricity, and industrial sectors, from top to bottom from note 5, p. 40,
349; Military electricity use is divided by 0.32 to account for losses in generation and transmission from note 5, p.42–43;
Petroleum use was divided by 0.78 to include energy used for production and refining from note 11.
c Expenditures for acquisitions and installations62,Tables 1 and 2; emissions factor from EIA (2009)5 (T.12.4, p. 353), corrected
to 2009 dollars (T.D1, p. 383).
d Average FY03-FY09, as reported63, Table 1.
e Emissions beyond those calculated in the emissions per dollar factor. Includes supply chain fuel, troop deployment, cement,
well fires and flaring.11
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Oil Production Trends, the
Economy, and U.S. Military
Activity in the Persian Gulf
A number of considerations support the contention that a considerable portion of conventional military activity, and even the Iraq War
itself, has been for the purpose of securing access to Persian Gulf petroleum supplies and maintaining a
low petroleum price for U.S. markets. After World War II, discovery of oil in the Middle East and declining British influence stimulated
more regional U.S. involvement. In
1945, the U.S. military established
an air base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, as a first step for securing oil
from the region.12 By 1979, the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led the U.S.
military to take more aggressive
steps to build a military infrastructure in the region in order to ensure
the flow of oil. The Carter Doctrine
(1980) explicitly established the Middle East and its oil supply as “vital
interests” of the U.S. economy and
explicitly threatened military force
to protect the area from regional adversaries. The military buildup in
the region culminated in 1983 with
the formation of U.S. Central Command, whose objectives were to ensure western access to oil, maintain
regional stability, and deter Soviet
influence (Figure 1).13 The U.S. military now protects global maritime
transit routes for oil, although with
primary focus on the Persian Gulf.
Peak Oil and the U.S. Economy
There are now growing concerns
that global production of easily accessible oil is nearing its maximum
rate.14 Global oil production is dominated by giant oil fields with the 500
largest fields contributing over 60
percent of production.15 In 2008, 580
of the 651 largest oil fields globally
were reported to have passed their
peak production rate and are now
producing an average of about 5–6
percent less oil each year.16 Based
on these findings, the International
Energy Agency (IEA) in 2008 stated
“the era of cheap oil is over.”17
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Based on decline rates, global oil
production is predicted by researchers at Uppsala University in Sweden to decline from 84 mb/d (including natural gas liquids) in 2007
to roughly 76 mb/d by 2030.18 Alternatively, official estimates from the
IEA optimistically anticipate that total liquid petroleum production (including natural gas liquids and unconventional sources) will continue
to increase through 2030, reaching a level 20 percent higher than
current levels (see Figure 2).19 The
U.S. Department of Energy anticipates an increase over this period of
about 15 percent. According to the
IEA, the share of global production
from OPEC countries will rise from
46 percent in 2007 to 56 percent in
2030. Saudi Arabia is projected to remain the world’s largest producer
throughout the period, its output increasing from 10.2 mb/d in 2007 to
15.6 mb/d in 2030. Yet, Saudi Arabia produced only 7.9 mb/d in 2009
due to OPEC production cuts to
maintain oil prices during the global
recession.20
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From 2000 to 2030, the largest
gains in petroleum production are
projected to come from two key regions: the Middle East and Central
Asia (see Table 2). In fact, 94 percent
of increases in production over this
period are expected to come from
10 nations, with Iraq and Kazakhstan as two of the top four countries with the largest production increase—both are connected to U.S.
military operations. Increasing production of nonconventional sources
of petroleum such as oil (tar) sands
from Canada will also help maintain
petroleum supply. Oil sands could
contribute as much as 20 percent of
the U.S. gasoline supply by 2020.21
Increasing oil demand driven
by developing economies such
as China, along with declining or
slower increases in production, will
cause oil prices to climb. The average oil price projected in 2008 for
the period 2008–2015 is $100 per
barrel, which is significantly higher
than the roughly $20 per barrel average oil price over the past half century. By 2030, both the IEA and EIA

Figure 2. Historical global production of crude oil and the contribution from the
Middle East, with projections to 2030, in million barrels per day. Global crude oil
(red), crude oil plus natural gas liquids (green), and the contribution of the Persian
Gulf (blue). Persian Gulf projection from 2015 and 2030 are for crude oil plus NGL.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2008, DOE/ EIA0384(2008) (Washington, DC, 2009), pp. 315, 317; Projections from International Energy
Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008 (Paris, France: OECD/IEA, 2008), p. 251.
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project oil to reach $170–190 per barrel in nominal dollars ($115–$130 in
2008 dollars).22 Some suggest, however, that the recent oil price spike
in 2008 to $147 per barrel (compared to roughly $80 per barrel in
March 2010) has stimulated greater
conservation and adaptation, which
may keep oil prices relatively lower
in the near term due to reduced demand.23 The current global recession
has temporarily reduced demand for
oil, and it is difficult to know how
quickly this impact will fade.
The cost of importing foreign
oil to the U.S. will continue to increase along with projected increases in oil prices (see Figure 3).
In 2007 with oil at $70 dollars per
barrel, the U.S. trade deficit in petroleum products was $293 billion,
or 36 percent of the total trade deficit of $819 billion.24 The high oil
prices of 2008 transferred a record
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of nearly $1 trillion dollars to members of OPEC.25 Regarding the prospects for such transfers in the future,
consider that the national oil companies in OPEC member states and
other countries (e.g., Saudi Aramco
and National Iranian Oil Company)
control approximately 90 percent of
the world’s oil reserves and 75 percent of global oil production; similar
numbers apply for natural gas.26 On
the other hand, the reserves of major
international oil companies (such as
Exxon-Mobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, BP, and Shell) were projected in
2004 by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission to be depleted by 2015–2017,
if their reserves are not expanded.27
If the oil supply were disrupted,
accompanying price spikes would
lead to significant negative impacts
on the global economy.28 While the
interrelationships between the business cycle and petroleum price are
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complicated and not easily resolved,
Brown and Huntington report that
10 of the 11 U.S. recessions since
World War II have been preceded
by significant oil price spikes.29 The
relationships between oil price and
the health of the economy suggest
that maintaining low and stable oil
prices is a political imperative associated with modern petroleum-fueled economies.
Military professionals recognize
the significance of these changes
in the oil economy for military preparedness. Professors at the U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School recently stated, “The idea of peak oil
is already becoming established as
a subtext or unspoken assumption
among strategists and policymakers …,” and it was further noted that
“The possibility that access to energy resources may become an object of large-scale armed struggle is

Table 2. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Liquids Production and Projections Regionally and for Selected
Countries
Regional Oil Production

2000

2007

2015

Δ2000–2030

2030

mb/d
Middle East-OPEC*
Central Asia
Non-Middle East-OPEC§
Latin America
Asia
North America
Europe

%

21.3
8.1
10.7
3.2
5.6
13.3
6.8

22.3
12.9
12.2
3.5
6.4
12.5
4.9

30.3
14.3
13.6
5.0
5.8
11.1
3.3

37.1
16.5
15
4.5
5.1
11.4
2.1

15.8
8.4
4.3
1.3
–0.5
–1.9
–4.7

74
104
40
41
–9
–14
–69

9.3
0.6
2.6
0.7
1.3
0.7
3.8
2.2
2.2
3.1

10.2
1.2
2.1
1.4
1.8
1.7
4.4
2.3
2.6
2.6

14.4
3.3
3.0
2.4
3.5
2.3
4.5
3.4
2.9
2.7

15.6
5.9
6.4
4.3
3.4
2.6
5.4
3.7
3.3
3.6

6.3
5.3
3.8
3.6
2.1
1.9
1.6
1.5
1.1
0.5

68
883
146
514
162
271
42
68
50
16

Countries—Highest Increases
Saudi Arabia
Canada (oil sands only)
Iraq
Kazakhstan
Brazil
Angola
Iran
Nigeria
Kuwait
Venezuela

* Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.
§ Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria,Venezuela.
Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008 (Paris, France: OECD/IEA, 2008), pp. 267, 272.
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Figure 3. Inflation-adjusted annual value of U.S. imports of crude oil in billions of
dollars. Constant dollars valued in the year 2000.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2008, DOE/ EIA0384(2008) (Washington, DC, 2009), p. 81.

almost incontestably the single most
alarming prospect facing the international system today.”30
Oil and the Iraq War
Many reasons may have led
the United States to invade Iraq in
2003. Initially, the Bush administration asserted that national security concerns were primary. Threats
from Iraq included the potential existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (justification 1) and
Iraq’s possible support of terrorism, as viewed after post–September 11, 2001 (justification 2). Based
on the Downing Street memo, it
now appears that the U.S. administration had already decided to invade Iraq by July 23, 2002, prior to
the re-entry of U.N. weapons inspectors back into the country and before the WMD threat could be evaluated.31 In February 2003, the month
immediately preceding the U.S. invasion, the U.S. administration asserted that democratization of Iraq
was another reason for invasion
(justification 3) and would foster a
larger political transformation of the
Middle East (justification 4).32 Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War,

the United States was also engaged
in an ongoing costly and unpopular sanctions campaign against Iraq
that the administration desired to
change (justification 5).33 To enforce
sanctions (such as the no-fly zone),
the United States kept military bases
in Saudi Arabia after the end of the
1991 conflict, against previous assurances that it would leave the peninsula. This U.S. presence in Saudi
Arabia agitated many Muslims, including Osama bin Laden, due to
the presence of “infidels in the Holy
Land”, and likely encouraged various terrorist attacks, including 9/11.
These circumstances led to U.S. interest in a new base in the Middle
East outside of Saudi Arabia, such
as Iraq (justification 6).34 Such a base
would be needed if the United States
wished to continue to have a strong
military presence in the region.
Attempts to foster regime change
in Iraq had already been an explicit
U.S. foreign policy since 1998.35 The
above justifications for war have
deep roots in the primary economic
concern for U.S. involvement in the
Middle East: the acquisition of oil
from the region.36 Iraq has the third
largest oil reserves globally at 115
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billion barrels (about 9 percent of
global crude oil reserves), following only Saudi Arabia and Iran in
size, and some evidence suggests
that Iraq’s reserves may be larger
than twice the proven amount.37 Regime change was thought to enable
Iraq to produce more oil and make
the United States less dependent on
Saudi Arabia.38 Some have asserted
that the U.S. government ultimately
sought to limit Iraq’s influence over
the Middle East and OPEC in order
to control oil prices more favorably
for the U.S. economy.39
Viewed from the perspective of
peak oil and the overwhelming majority of reserves under the control of
national oil companies and OPEC nations, and the fact that a significant
rise in oil price could cripple the U.S.
economy, the assertion that the U.S.
invasion of Iraq sought to control access to oil with the aim to control oil
prices appears to carry substantial
weight. There is now growing consensus among economic, foreign
policy, and military analysts that
oil played a large part in the United
States. led invasion of Iraq,40 even
though official statements from the
U.S. government deny such claims.
In 2007, former U.S. Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan clearly articulated the critical place of oil in the
global economy and its relationship
to the U.S. invasion:
I am saddened that it is politically
inconvenient to acknowledge what
everyone knows: the Iraq War is
largely about oil. Thus, projections
of world oil supply and demand
that do not note the highly precarious environment of the Middle
East are avoiding the eight-hundred-pound gorilla that could bring
world economic growth to a halt.41

In hindsight, the U.S. invasion of
Iraq has been viewed by many as a
“war of choice” not a “war of necessity.” It has been asserted that the
Iraq invasion was a unilateral preventive war that could have been
avoided through the use of other
viable policy alternatives.42 When
viewed in a historical perspective, it
was clearly understood by U.S. military personnel in U.S. Central Command that “the invasion of Iraq is
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only the latest in a series of military
engagements in the Gulf proceeding
from the Carter Doctrine,”43 which
clearly places its roots in oil.
Many documents preceding the
U.S. invasion provide insight into
the thinking of policymakers at the
time. In 2001, the U.S. National Energy Policy Development Group
(NEPD) provided an energy outlook for a country increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil: “By
2020, Gulf oil producers are projected to supply between 54 and 67
percent of the world’s oil … The Gulf
will be a primary focus of U.S. international energy policy…” and “The
NEPD Group recommends that the
President support initiatives by Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Qatar, the
UAE, and other suppliers [Iraq] to
open up areas of their energy sectors to foreign investment.”44 In addition to this document, other related
documents before the invasion indicate an intense interest by the multinational oil companies and the Bush
administration to gain better access to
Middle Eastern oil. For example, the
Bush administration discussed the logistics of a military invasion of Iraq in
its first national security meeting in
2001, two years before its invasion.45
Now, after the U.S. invasion and implementation of a new government,
multinational oil companies (e.g.,
Exxon, BP) are establishing new contracts in Iraq that will extend the lifetime of their companies.

Attributing Military
Emissions in the Persian Gulf
to U.S. Gasoline Consumption
Life cycle assessment (LCA) has
incorporated two approaches to attributing emissions to industrial processes, namely, the attributional and
consequential approaches.46 Attributional LCA is an analytical approach
in which emissions from various
components in a production process,
from acquisition of raw materials to
final product use, are inventoried and
attributed to a single product or allocated to one product (e.g., fuel) in
proportion to its share of all products
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from a multiproduct system, measured alternatively in terms of the
fraction of energy, mass, or value.
The consequential LCA approach attempts to identify the total marginal
change in emissions that would occur as a consequence of some change
in the output of the product. The attributional approach is an accounting exercise, and it is not without
its conceptual and assessment difficulties. The consequential LCA approach is even more difficult, because
in addition to the accounting assessment, it demands an assessment of
all changes in human behavior that
would result from the change in fuel
use, if that behavioral change would
also result in a significant emissions
change. Of course, it is this total impact on GHG emissions that is relevant to climate change and so to
public policy, but these prospective
changes in behavior may include
quite distant ripple effects that are
impossible to assess without a considerable amount of judgment, given
that it involves uncertain changes in
human behavior, as well as the usual
difficulties in emissions accounting.
Attributing Military Security Emissions to U.S. Gasoline
Life cycle GHG emissions calculations associated with U.S. gasoline production and use have included emissions from the extraction
and shipping of oil as well as combustion, but related military security
emissions have been omitted as direct components of the production
life cycle.47 These calculations have
been faulty because warships are to
oil what combine harvesters are to
biofuels. Where combines are mechanical components that use fossil
fuels to collect and deliver crops to
produce biofuels, the military today
is essential for collecting oil from
distant regions and delivering it for
gasoline production: both are direct
supply chain operations that must
be included in the LCA of these
products. Recent U.S. federal law
and government documents make
this clear, as does common sense,
given the clear security issues associated with maritime oil trade today.
The U.S. Security and Accountability
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for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 calls
on the United States to “develop, implement, and update, as appropriate, a strategic plan to enhance the
security of the international supply
chain … [and] provide measurable
goals, including objectives, mechanisms, and a schedule, for furthering
the security of commercial operations
from point of origin to point of destination.”48 According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office report
in 2007 regarding oil and gas tankers specifically, “successful attacks
abroad, the expressed desire by terrorists to target U.S. economic interests, and the potential outcome of a
terrorist attack on a tanker have led
Congress and the Administration to
conclude that protective efforts are
warranted.”49 The DoD was explicitly identified in the report as responsible to maintain “… a credible maritime interdiction capability to deal
with identified hostile ships at any
location when authorized to do so.”
Furthermore, in addition to the DoD,
the total security activities coordinated among the U.S. Coast Guard,
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security were found to be inadequate, stressing the need for more
investment in security: “Much is being done, both internationally and
domestically, to protect energy commodity tankers and their attendant
facilities from attack, but notwithstanding these actions, significant
challenges may still leave tankers and
facilities at risk.”49
The analysis presented in the sections above, federal law, and these
statements combine to clearly indicate
that today, military security is within
the boundaries of the gasoline production process. Whereas previous
assessments have drawn the boundaries with military security on the
outside of the petroleum life cycle, attributional LCA of GHG emissions
must now be updated by regulators to reflect that military security is
within the direct operational boundaries of the petroleum supply chain.
Several studies have estimated
the fraction of military expenditures
attributable to securing oil supplies,
from which we may be able to in-
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Wikimedia Commons/Master Sgt. Ken Hammond, U.S. Air Force
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fer the fraction of GHG emissions.
These estimates suggest that $27 to
$138 billion dollars is spent annually by the U.S. military for protection of Middle Eastern maritime oil
transit routes and oil infrastructure,
with an average of $84 billion dollars
per year.50 The most recent analysis
from the National Priorities Project
estimates oil-related military costs
for 2009 based on primary materials including unclassified military
strategy documents, posture statements, testimony by DoD officials,
and DoD statistics. Two different
methods were used in their analysis.
The first method uses a global forceplanning approach which accounts
for having to fight two major wars
simultaneously (e.g. Persian Gulf
and North Korea), and allocates 40
percent of U.S. conventional military
costs to the Middle East, and then attributes 75 percent of those costs to
oil alone resulting in $97 billion of
an estimated $517 billion DoD budget of 2009. The second estimate attributes the fraction of three regional
U.S. Unified Commands (e.g. Central, European, and Pacific Commands) to oil security, which results
in an estimate of $104 billion dollars
for global protection of oil. Based

on these two approaches, we therefore conclude that about 20 percent
of the conventional DoD budget is a
reasonable estimate of the fraction of
emissions attributable to the objective of oil security.
This 20 percent attribution rate
implies that of the annual conventional military emissions, approximately 16 MMt CO2e per year can
be attributed to oil security (see Table 3); or 0.2 percent of total U.S.
emissions at 6957 MMt CO2e in
2008.51 We estimate that 61 billion liters of gasoline (46.1 percent by volume) were derived from the 787 million barrels of petroleum the United
States imports per year from the Persian Gulf on average from 2005 to
2009, so attributing this fraction of
the Gulf oil security emissions to
gasoline imports implies that 8.1 g
CO2e of emissions are associated
with each megajoule (MJ) of Gulf
gasoline (Table 3). This is equivalent to roughly 8 percent of the current base emissions attributed to a
MJ of energy in gasoline used in the
United States.
In an alternative calculation, the
consequential LCA approach asks by
how much these military emissions
would be reduced if the United States

were to sufficiently reduce gasoline
consumption to eliminate Persian
Gulf imports. It was recently asserted
that if the United States stopped imports from the region, U.S. military
infrastructure in the Middle East
would disappear. Retired U.S. colonel and Boston University professor
Andrew Bacevich recently stated:
Imagine the impact just on the Pentagon [DoD] were this country actually to achieve anything approaching energy independence.
U.S. Central Command would go
out of business. Dozens of bases in
and around the Middle East would
close. The navy’s fifth fleet would
stand down. Weapons contracts
worth tens of billions would risk
being canceled.52

Such a reduction in imports may
occur over a 20-year timeframe. Production of 57 billion liters per year
(bly) of ethanol from corn, as mandated by EISA legislation, would be
approximately sufficient to substitute
for the 61 bly of gasoline from Middle East oil imports averaged from
2005 to 2009. The elimination of Middle East oil imports would allow cessation of military oil security activity,
equivalent to a 20-percent reduction
in conventional U.S. military activity
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Table 3. Oil-Related Military GHG Emissions from Gasoline by Attributional and Consequential LCA
Approaches
Oil Security,
Attrib.
Annual oil-related military emissionsa
(MMt CO2e yr-1)

34.4

Oil Security,
Conseq.
34.4

Iraq War,
Attrib.
43.3

Oil Security +
Iraq War, Attrib.
77.8

Oil-related military emissions per MJ of gasoline from Persian Gulf imports
U.S. petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf,
average 2005–2009b (M. bbl yr-1) 				
787
Gasoline from above imports, at 76.8 liters/barrelc
(b. liters yr-1) 				
60.5
Military emissions allocated to gasoline,
46.1%c of volume (MMt CO2e yr-1)

15.9 		

20.0

35.8

262

569

331

593

Military emissions per MJ of Gulf gasoline energy,
at 32.6 MJ per liter (g CO2e MJ-1)
8.1

17.5

10.1

18.2

97.7

97.7

97.7

97.7

Military emissions plus base emissions
(g CO2e MJ-1)

105.8

115.2

107.8

115.9

Percent increase over gasoline base, %

8%

18%

10%

19%

Military emissions allocated to gasoline,
100% of volume (MMt CO2e yr-1) 34.4
Military emissions per liter of Gulf gasoline
(g CO2e l-1)

Base lifecycle emissions of
(g CO2e MJ-1)

gasolined

Oil-related military emissions per MJ for all U.S. gasoline
Total gasoline consumption in the U.S. in 2009
(b. liters yr-1)e
				
522
Military emissions per liter of all U.S. gasoline
(g CO2e l-1)

30

66

38

69

Military emissions per MJ (g CO2e MJ-1)

0.9

2.0

1.2

2.1

Military emissions plus base emissions
(g CO2e MJ-1)

98.6

99.7

98.9

99.8

Percent increase over gasoline base, %

1.0%

2.1%

1.2%

2.2%

Sources:
a 20% of conventional emissions, 100% of war emissions in Table 1.
b EIA, Petroleum Supply Monthly, T.52, accessed online 3/11/2010.
c Average yield of gasoline from petroleum in 2009 = 46.1% (EIA, Petroleum Supply Monthly,T.34, accessed March 11, 2010).
d note 1.
e Total gasoline supplied 2009, 138 b. gal = 522 b. l (EIA, Petroleum Supply Monthly, T.1, accessed online March 11, 2010).
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and emissions, which in turn is equivalent to 17.5 g CO2e per MJ of gasoline
energy now imported from the Middle East (Table 3). If this consequence
is a plausible and reasonable prediction, regulatory authorities should
include these indirect military emissions as they compare the GHG consequences of substituting biofuels for
gasoline from the Persian Gulf.
We note that this 18 g CO2e per
MJ of gasoline energy from military
security is roughly equivalent to the
14 to 27 g CO2e per MJ currently attributed to corn ethanol energy due
to consequential indirect land use
change.53 We further suggest that
the confidence interval around our
estimate is comparable to the confidence interval on the latter figures.54
The key uncertainties in our estimate are associated with the total direct costs of military security for petroleum infrastructure and transit
routes, including U.S. Coast Guard
and other agencies (which are likely
to be greater than our estimate of
emissions from the military alone);
emissions from the U.S. military-industrial complex (an area that has
recently received little attention);
and whether the elimination of Middle East imports would result in a 20
percent reduction of conventional
military activity.55
It can also be argued that imports
might be reduced by only 50 percent instead of completely, and in
that case we would expect little if
any reduction in oil security activity, given that no less effort may be
required to provide safe passage for
half of current ships compared to all
of them. It can also be argued that if
the United States reduced or eliminated its dedication to oil security
in the Middle East, another country
would increase its own efforts for
that purpose, thus offsetting the climate change impact of eliminating
U.S. imports from the area. These
ambiguities highlight the difficulties
of predicting human behavior that
would result from a change in U.S.
fuel use—difficulties common to
all consequential LCA analyses. We
have implicitly excluded those possibilities as behavioral outcomes—
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US Marine Corps CH 53 Helicopter at Camp Korean Village, Iraq. Official U.S. Marine Corps Photo by Capt.
Paul Greenberg

assigned probabilities of zero to
them. To that extent, our evaluation
is an incomplete analysis on which to
base fuel policy. We hasten to point
out, however, that current regulatory
decisions are already based on similarly incomplete analysis, which results in an unbalanced consideration
of the likely impacts of substituting
one fuel for the other. Specifically, the
14 to 27 g CO2e per MJ currently attributed to corn ethanol energy due
to indirect land use change is based
on the assumption that 57 bly of ethanol produced in the United States
will drive land use change abroad,
with zero probabilities assigned to alternative outcomes, and zero probability assigned to the prospect that
land use regulations or forest retention programs might alter marketdriven levels of conversions of forests
to crops as a result of that additional
production, etc.
Given that the indirect land use
emissions currently attributed to
biofuels and the military security
emissions attributed here to Gulf
gasoline are based on similarly incomplete analyses of alternative behavioral outcomes, it would be correct for the U.S. EPA to include these
estimates for both fuels. This would
help base the emissions comparison
on assessments of single outcome behavioral consequences of a change in

fuel use, and so provide a balanced
assessment of likely consequences
for climate change. Coincidentally,
these military emissions due to gasoline are roughly equal to land use
emissions attributed to corn ethanol in a hypothetical, but probable,
future. Yet, this attribution would
only be accurate for the comparison
of corn-ethanol with the fraction of
gasoline derived from Middle Eastern imports. A comprehensive fuel
policy should attribute emissions to
each different source of petroleum,
as is done for biofuels (gasoline from
petroleum is currently assigned only
an average value).
Iraq War Emissions and U.S.
Gasoline
The fraction of Iraq War emissions that should be attributed to the
use of petroleum is another difficult
matter to judge. In Table 3, we calculate and report that the amount of
these emissions is equivalent to 10.1
g CO2e per MJ of Gulf gasoline consumed in the U.S. (or equivalent to
1.2 g CO2e per MJ of all gasoline consumed in 2009 as a reference). This
amounts to 10 percent of the current
base GHG emissions established for
gasoline. From an attributional LCA
viewpoint, based on the economic
importance of oil and other findings
discussed above, it is reasonable to
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attribute perhaps 75 percent to 100
percent of the war to oil, and 46 percent of this amount to gasoline. But
so far, little oil has flowed from Iraq
to the United States.
From a consequential LCA perspective, however, what is relevant
to future policy is the likely reduction in war activity that would occur as a consequence of reduced U.S.
consumption of gasoline, relative to
likely war activity with imports continuing at their current levels. Suppose, for example, that the likelihood of war in the area in the future
is 15 percent with current U.S. gasoline consumption, but only 5 percent
with no U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf. The expected emissions
reduction due to this change in policy would then be 10 percent of 43
MMt of war-related CO2e emissions,
equivalent to 1.0 g CO2e per MJ and
roughly 1 percent of base emissions
from gasoline. So, given the difficulties of assigning probabilities to
war in the future, plausible evaluations of these indirect war emissions
consequentially due to gasoline consumption range from near zero to 10
percent of base gasoline emissions,
or perhaps even more.
Overall military emissions associated with gasoline from the Middle East are then found to range
from 8.1 to 18.2 g CO2e per MJ, with
attributional military security alone

at the low end to attributional military security and the Iraq War at
the high end; the consequential approach to military security emissions alone is 17.5 g CO2e per MJ. It
should also be noted that as petroleum imports decline, the intensity
of these emissions would increase
if expenditures for military security
were to remain constant.

Probable Future Military
Activities for Oil
Current challenges for the petroleum economy include a precarious
flow of imports, wealth transfer and
contribution to trade deficits, costly
military operations, and related international terrorism.56 These serious
economic and national security issues
have recently stimulated support for
the development of alternative energy sources in the United States.57
In addition to domestic initiatives,
the U.S. Air Force, the world’s single largest consumer of petroleum,
recently announced a plan to substitute 50 percent of its fuel use with alternative fuels, with particular emphasis on biofuels.58 Yet, biofuels
will be able to supply no more than
roughly 25 percent of motor fuel in
the foreseeable future, so other regions where oil supplies are available
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will likely see greater military investment and intervention.
Kazakhstan is of interest because
it has one of the largest oil reserves
globally (Figure 1), and it is one of
the top four countries with the greatest projected increase in production
capacity over the next 20 years (Table 2). Kazakhstan contains three of
the world’s 10 largest giant oil fields
(newly discovered), and the country is now Chevron’s leading source
of petroleum, currently exported via
pipelines heading west through Georgia.59 As a corollary to Iraq, U.S. military activities in Afghanistan also appear to be at least partially stimulated
by oil. Pipelines for transportation of
oil and gas from Central Asia to the
Indian Ocean are currently planned
and have been discussed for at least
15 years.60 Such potential pipelines
would transport oil from the Caspian region, bypassing Russia and the
Turkish Straights, and Iran and the
Straight of Hormuz (Figure 1).
In U.S. Congressional testimony
in 2006, Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South
and Central Asian Affairs at the
State Department, clearly outlined
U.S. intentions concerning oil in the
Afghanistan region:
Since the independence of the new
Caspian states 15 years ago, the
United States has been in the forefront of oil and gas development
in the region, and our efforts are
paying off.… With the completion of the first phase of the EastWest Energy Corridor [through
Georgia], we must now press on
with the second phase of supporting new energy routes out of Central Asia.… The United States and
the countries of the broader region
share an interest in the free movement of energy, people, goods,
and information from the Kazakh
steppes to the Indian Ocean. We
want not only to support economic
development along a north–south
axis, but also afford Afghanistan
access to a wider world, thus becoming a bridge, not a barrier.61

These explicit activities related to
oil in the Afghanistan region suggest
that further emissions related to military activity there might reasonably
be included in the emissions of gaso-
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USS Kitty Hawk in Sydney, Australia. Wikimedia Commons/PH2 William H. Ramsey, USN

line, if fuel were to pass through that
region to the U.S. This additional
case further supports the notion that
the military is highly engaged in securing foreign oil today.
The analysis presented here suggests that GHG emissions from military activities should be included
in the GHG intensity of gasoline, as
the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency implements emissions requirements for biofuels relative to petroleum fuels. For military security
emissions related to gasoline use, attributional calculations produce a result nearly half that of consequential calculations, but there is greater
uncertainty in allocating additional
emissions from the Iraq War.
To accurately determine the degree that biofuels can reduce GHG
emissions that contribute to climate change, we must develop a
better understanding of U.S. military GHG emissions related to oil acquisition. U.S. fuel policy must be
guided by the best possible estimates
of the GHG consequences of switching from gasoline to renewable fuels.
Emissions changes that indirectly result as consequences of changes in
policy must surely be included in rational policymaking, but these emissions can only be estimated with con-

siderable judgment and substantial
uncertainties. Given that the potential
GHG implications of future behavioral change may be quite significant
for changes in gasoline use as well as
for changes in ethanol use, it is appropriate that they should be considered by regulatory agencies, as well
as necessary that they be considered
as the 2007 EISA legislation directs.
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